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Introduction
The individual investor has been carefully scrutinized in the growing literature on behavioral …nance. A number of studies have documented the underperformance of the do-it-yourself trader. Odean (1999) and Barber and Odean (2000) traced the poor performance to excessive trading.
Pro…ts are eroded, Barber and Odean (2001) observe, by overcon…dence. A tendency to sell winners quickly and hold onto losers, the disposition e¤ ect of Shefrin and Statman (1985) , also hurts pro…ts.
Other studies have attributed underperformance to poor stock selection. Goetzmann and Kumar (2004) found retail traders are underdiversi…ed. observed a tendency to buy attention grabbing stocks. Investors in Debondt and Thaler (1987) rely excessively on past returns which they attribute to Kahneman and Tversky's (1974) representativeness heuristic.
Other studies, including Huberman (2001) , Massa and Simonov (2003) , and Amadi (2004) , have noted that traders tended to pick the same stocks again and again, a habit they called familiarity bias. An excellent survey of this growing literature is by Barberis and Thaler (2002) .
This paper studies a group of active traders, the majority of whom trade pro…tably. The study of skilled traders has been comparatively limited. Coval, Hirshleifer and Shumway (2002) …nd that the top 10% of investors earn persistent abnormal pro…ts. Nicolosi, Peng, and Zhu (2003) observe that individual investors learn about their trading skill and increase their trades and pro…ts in subsequent periods A more specialized literature has focused on day traders. Linnainmaa (2003) has a comprehensive data set of day traders in Finland, but …nds they perform no better than other investors. Barber, Lee, Liu and Odean (2004) have a similar data set for Taiwan. They document that over 80% of day traders lose money, but that traders with strong performance continue to outperform.
Daytrading brokers in the U.S. have generally been reluctant to provide information on their customers. Nonetheless, Jordan and Diltz (2003) found 36% of the 324 traders they studied in 1998 and 1999 at a national security …rm were pro…table, with pro…ts strongly correlated with the Nasdaq market. Another exception is Garvey and Murphy (2003) who study a proprietary daytrading team of 15 people over a period of three months. These traders emulate market makers with very short term holding periods. Traders in this group average 115 trades per day and are consistently pro…table.
Our paper relies on a unique data set compiled by the …rst author from a public Internet chat room. Traders voluntarily post their entries and exists from positions in real time. The room is 2 monitored and members must register their nicknames. We …nd a skillful group of traders in a four one month snapshots of this trading room from 2000 to 2003.
We …nd that our traders resemble, in some aspects, the more unsophisticated retail investors.
They exhibit familiarity bias, concentrating their trading in a small number of high volume Nasdaq stocks. They also trade frequently. The ten most active traders average 142 trades per month.
For our skilled traders, these biases work to their advantage. The majority of them trade pro…tably, after transactions costs, in each month. They hold their winners 25% longer than their losers. They stick with their favorite stocks throughout the trading month, independent of past returns and volatility. Highly concentrated portfolios have the highest pro…tability. Raising the trader's Her…ndahl index by 0:1 raises their pro…t per trade by $46. Contrary to the overtrading results, the traders who trade more frequently make more money, earning $153 per trade. Adjusting for the Fama-French factors and momentum, the traders have statistically signi…cant 's of 0:41% per day.
We also …nd persistence in performance. Trading pro…ts from the previous year for an individual trader strongly predict trading pro…ts in the next year. 38% of pro…ts persist in the next year.
Traders bene…t from experience. Each year in the trading room adds $189 to their monthly trading pro…ts.
42% of traders take short positions. Traders are equally likely to make pro…ts trading long or short, and their pro…t per trade on the short side is nearly double that on the long. Traders who trade both short and long have a 10% higher chance of trading pro…tably.
The paper is organized as follows. The second section describes the chat room and illustrates the kind of information that we have logged. The third section describes the results of a survey of chat room participants. We study stock selection in the fourth section. The …fth section focuses on pro…tability. A …nal section concludes.
Description of the Chat Room

Activetrader
Activetrader is a public Internet chat room accessible without any user fees. It is the largest of several discussion forums managed through the Financialchat.com network. With a simple piece of software known as a chat client, traders can view and post information about their trading 3 activities that is visible to everyone else in the room. Traders register their nicknames. Over short time periods, we can be sure these are unique to a speci…c individual. The room is monitored by about a dozen operators whose nicknames appear with an @ pre…x. During the four years of our analysis, the chat room averaged approximately 1; 300 traders. Only a small portion of these traders, around 13%, post their trades in the room. In total, we analyze almost 9; 000 trades.
[INSERT Table 1 Here] Public access rooms like Activetrader need to be di¤erentiated from the numerous fee based trading rooms on the Internet. In fee based rooms, novice traders pay to have access to the expertise of skilled traders. While there are many legitimate operations of this type, there were several well publicized cases of abuse. A notorious example of this was a room run by a Korean-American Yun Soo Oh Park who operated under the name of "Tokyo Joe."Park was …ned 1 by the SEC in March 2001 for front running the picks he made in the room.
Activetrader is a decentralized organization with no master stock pickers. The role of the operators in Activetrader is primarily to …lter out hyping and non-market relevant posts. Repeated violations result in traders being banned from the room. Traders are also discouraged from posting information about stocks with trading prices of less than $1.00.
The room is a cooperative venture. Traders perceive themselves to be in competition with market makers and institutional traders. While often working in isolation, they participate in a "virtual trading ‡oor" that "simulates the ebb and ‡ow and signals of investor sentiment." This "support group" helps traders keep track of fundamental and technical information about their stock positions 2 . The posts primarily contain information about technical analysis. Notice the observations by Udaman about Register.Com (RCOM) and Matrix on Yahoo (YHOO) clearing a particular resistance level. There are also posts about fundamentals. BigCheez is reporting on an analyst report on RCOM. In general, these fundamental posts are restricted to news events like upgrades and earnings announcements. There is very little debate about the merits of a company's products or earnings, as in the bulletin board information studies by Antweiler and Frank (2004) .
Logs and …lters
We …lter out this information to isolate the trade posts. There are two in this group, the purchase of Priceline.com by Matrix and the sale of Commerce One Inc. (CMRC) by HCG, both at 10:16. Neither trader posts an entry or exit price or a trade size. In our analysis of pro…tability in Section 4, we study the number of price posts which do not match the time series of bids and 5 asks. Since we cannot verify the trade size, we do not use it in any of the return analysis.
Traders use a wide variety of slang for their trades. We used various forms of the keywords, including their abbreviations and misspelled variants, to indicate buying activity: Accumulate; Add; Back; Buy; Cover; Enter; Get; Grab; In; Into; Load; Long; Nibble; Nip; Pick; Poke; Reload; Take; and Try. Keywords for selling were: Dump; Out; Scalp; Sell; Short; Stop; and Purge.
We cannot match open and closing trades for about 70% of the posts. We assume that all open positions whether long or short are closed at the end of the day. We do not consider after hours trades.
Survey Data
We asked traders in the months of February and March 2004 to …ll out a survey about their trading activities. We asked them questions about portfolio size, trading frequency, entry and exit strategies. A tabulation of the survey results is in Table 2 .
[INSERT Table 2 Here] 67 people from the Activetraders Chat Room participated in our survey. The picture that emerges of the day trader is consistent with prior surveys. The average trader is a middle aged male, with about $100,000 exposed in the market. The age and sex distribution of our survey is similar to the SEC day trading 3 study.
The survey results, as well as comments received, seem to indicate that these are con…dent individuals, who are suspicious of analysts and other insiders as demonstrated by their willingness to prefer "Internet Messages Boards" as an entry strategy, over "Investment Opinion Services". Barber and Odean (2001) have found that overcon…dent males tend to be poor traders.
Most of day traders in the survey are experienced, having been trading for more than 5 years.
Given the time period of our study, this would mean that these day traders mostly started trading right before, and during, the Internet bubble. These day traders also endured the subsequent bear market. 74:64% of them trade 8 or fewer stocks a day, with a median of 4. Half of them hold their trades less than 6:5 hours (a whole trading day).
A distinctive feature of day traders is that 60:29% used both long and short positions. The more seasoned traders (more than 5 years) also engaged in option and futures trading, while a small minority trade commodities and bonds. Although the survey didn't address whether the trader used these issues as hedging vehicles, our observations of day-to-day trading would tend to indicate the opposite is true. Instead of hedging a uncertain position, day traders will usually close the position and move on to the next opportunity. It is interesting to note, that the more experienced traders were the ones most likely (73%) to trade in high risk issues such as options, futures and commodities. This would seem to indicate that as the trader gets more experience, they demonstrate a risk seeking behavior, in order to maximize their returns.
One of the main points of our survey was to determine how traders choose their entry point in a trade. As expected, day traders are momentum players. The survey showed that 75% pick a stock, and its entry point based on momentum measures. Technical analysis, in its many forms, is the second most preferred method. The third most popular entry strategy (59:7%) was based on "News". Although "Past Experience" was the fourth most popular method with 46:27%, our analysis of trading activity showed that day traders tended to trade the same issues repeatedly.
Very interestingly, 39% of respondents used "Gut instinct" to enter a trade. Of those who use instinct, 95% had traded less than …ve years. Although it is generally assumed that day traders have a herd mentality, these measures did not rate highly in our survey. "Other Trader Picks", was only the …fth most popular pick at 44:78%, with the other herding measures "Message Boards", and, "Investment Opinion Services", getting only 10:45% and 7:46% support respectively. "Stop losses" and "Target percentage" were the dominant exit strategies, used by 65:67% or traders. "Technical analysis"(46:27%) and "Past Experience"(44:78%) appear to help them choose the exit points. "Gut instinct" (37:31%) is third. Again, the less experienced traders are most likely citing instinct as a trading method. Day traders appear to seek short term gains rather than hedging (4:48%) long term positions.
Technical analysis is widely used for both entries and exits. The two most popular technical analyses tools "Chart Patterns" (56:72%), and "Moving Averages" (52:24%) are among the easiest to understand and utilize. The more complicated, and mathematically demanding methods, "Stochastics", "Fibonacci Analysis", and "Bollinger Bands", are more rarely used.
Stock Selection
This section examines stock selection by the chat room as a whole. We …rst examine the cross sectional characteristics of the stocks that traders choose. Then we try to examine whether traders 7 focus on a relatively small number of stocks. Finally, we explain daily stock selection as a function of volume and returns.
Cross section
Let n k;t denote the number of trades in stock k on day t. De…ne n b k;t and n a k;t analogously for the long and short trades. N t = P K n b k;t + n a k;t is the total number of trades, where K denotes the universe of securities. The totals for long and short trades are N b t = P K n b k;t and N a t = P K n a k;t . Denote the trading frequency in stock k;
De…ne p b k;t and p a k;t similarly for long and short trades. We want to understand the cross section characteristics of the stocks selected each month,
where T is the number of trading days. We examine whether traders choose stocks with large market capitalizations, high 's, and high trading volume
The market cap is based on the market value on the day before the trading month begins, the is computed based on the previous 50 days covariance with the S&P 500, the trading volume V k is the average from the previous month. Results for (3) for each trading month and all four years are in Table 3 . We estimate the model for all trades, and long and short trades separately 
Trade concentration
The chat room provides a unique laboratory for testing hypotheses about trade concentration. We observe a reasonably large group of people sharing a common information set. We …rst measure concentration by looking at the proportion of trades in the most active securities. We then report
Her…ndahl indexes for the room and the most active individual traders. Frequently traded stocks in the chat room
We report trade frequency results separately for NASDAQ and NYSE issues in Table 4 . Traders trade NASDAQ stocks more six time more often than NYSE stocks (1,142 versus 182). This ratio is higher in 2000 and 2001 (8:59 and 9:68) than in 2002 or 2003 (3:83 and 3:66 ). This appears to be due either to the collapse of the Internet bubble or to a declining appetite for risk. In the previous section, we found that did not enter the stock selection cross section after 2001.
[INSERT Table 4 Here]
Trade concentration in NYSE stocks is much higher than in NASDAQ issues. The 5-stock concentration ratio averages 63:58% for the NYSE stocks and only 18:22% for NASDAQ. The 25-stock concentration ratio is over 90% for the NYSE and 47% for NASDAQ.
The pattern of long trades is similar to the pattern of overall trades. For NASDAQ issues, the 5-stock concentration ratios never di¤er by more than 2% from the overall …gure. The 25-stock concentration is always within 4%. The NYSE concentration ratios are within 5% of the all trade averages at 5 and 25-stock levels, except for 2001.
Short trades are substantially more concentrated than longs. The average 5-stock NASDAQ concentration ratio is nearly 30%, more than 12% higher than for longs. At 25-stocks, the average concentration ratio is 71:22% versus 44:91% for the longs. The NYSE di¤erences are similar. The average 5-stock concentration ratio is almost 77% versus 60:83% for longs. The gap at 25 stocks is smaller, 8:85%, only because the ratio is 100% for the shorts.
The most frequent stocks selected in 2000 and 2001 are in 
We de…ne a similar index H b t for long and H a t for short trades. If trades were distributed uniformly, the Her…ndahl index would equal 1=K. If all trading was in a single stock, then the Her…ndahl would equal 1:0: We will take as the null hypothesis that trading activity in the room is proportional to trading volume V k;t in the market as a whole,
where
We compare the two Her…ndahl indexes in Table 6 [INSERT Table 6 Here]
using an F -test for the variance ratio, KH t 1 KH !;t 1 :
In Table 6 , we …nd that none of the Her…ndahl numbers exceed the market's measure. The room as a whole is signi…cantly less concentrated than the market.
Her…ndahl indexes for traders
The fact that the room is not concentrated does not imply that individual traders do not focus on speci…c issues. De…ne the trading frequency of trader j in the k th security on day t; p j;k;t = n j;k;t N j;t :
where n j;k;t is the number of trades and N j;t = P K n b j;k;t + n a j;k;t : De…ne a Her…ndahl index for trader j H j;t = P K p 2 j;k;t : 10 We compare this to the market weights again using the variance ratio KH t 1 KH !;t 1 (10)
For 2000, in have examined the question of stock selection among individual investors.
Daily trading frequency
They …nd in a large sample of retail traders and investors that traders tend to buy attention grabbing stocks. They measure this in three ways: abnormal trading volume, previous day's returns, and the square of the previous day's returns. Using daily data from CRSP, we measured abnormal volume AV k;t 1 as the percentage di¤erence from the 50-day moving average. The return series is constructed from daily closing prices. A positive e¤ect from past returns is a prediction of the representativeness heuristic. The squared return is a proxy 4 for volatility.
This regression adds the lagged trading frequency modeled by Barber, Odean, and Zhu (2003) .
We estimate this equation, pooled and by month, for all trades, buys and short sells separately.
Results are in Table 7 .
[INSERT Table 7 Here]
For the sample as a whole, for all trades, two regressors are signi…cant, the lagged trading frequency and the abnormal volume. It is the lagged frequency, however, that predominates. It has a much stronger t ratio, and it enters signi…cantly in all the sub-samples. Abnormal volume only enters signi…cantly in the grouped four year sample for all trades. A ten million share increase in abnormal volume would raise the overall trading frequency by only 0:03%: The four variables explain about 11:5% of the trade frequency. In the 2002 sub-sample, the R 2 is the highest at 22:4%.
Long and short trades are driven by the previous day's trading frequency. For long trades, the lagged trading frequency is signi…cant in each sub-sample. Abnormal volume is signi…cant in the overall sample, and lagged returns matter in 2000 and 2002. Short trade frequencies have less persistence than long ones. b 1 is signi…cant on the short trades only in 2003, and in the grouped four year sample. The model also …ts the long trades slightly better than the short ones.
Our interpretation of the lagged frequency variable is di¤erent than Barber, Odean and Zhu.
Traders do have a familiarity bias, but we attribute this to stock speci…c trading skills. We …nd below, in our examination of pro…ts, that traders who stick with a few familiar stocks make more money.
Short selling
Traders in the Activetrader chat room short more often that do normal retail traders. Angel, Christophe and Ferri (2003) found that only 1 in 42 trades on Nasdaq is a short sale. In only 0.29 percent of the more than 66,000 traders in the room take short positions.
In Table 1 , we see that our activetraders short very often, more than 27% of the time over the four months. In the peak month, April 2001, 33:88% of the trades are shorts. 41:58% of traders make at least one short sale in the four year sample. In the next section, we see that they trade pro…tably on the short and long side.
Holding period
Activetrader is primarily populated by daytraders. Table 1 shows that they have very short holding times on average. The average trade duration is 55:11 minutes for trades where we see both entries and exits. We call these trades round trips. These represent only about 30% of trades. For the trades we close out, the average duration is 186:77 minutes. We will restrict our analysis of the disposition e¤ect to the round trip 5 trades.
We now assess the e¤ects of these trading decisions on pro…ts and returns.
Pro…t and Return Analysis
There are two major concerns which must be addressed in computing the pro…tability of trading in the chat room. First, we do not observe position sizes. These are rarely reported, and are probably unreliable. We will make two assumptions: (A) 1,000 share lot size; (B) $25,000 per trade; We also do not observe actual trading prices. Fortunately, these can be matched against quote data.
We compare the price posted by the trader to the high and low bid price during the minute the trade is posted. If the price posted falls in this range, we use the traders posted price. If it does not, we use the opening bid price for that minute. We …nd that 5:32% of trade reports use false prices that deviate more than 1% from the one minute quote range.
Pro…ts
To compute dollar pro…t and losses for each trader, we make transaction cost assumptions for position size assumptions A and B. For position A, we assume a $20 commission. This is a $0.01 per share commission on the 1,000 share round trip. Numerous brokers o¤er commissions in this range. For position size B, we assume a $0.005 per share commission and a 50 basis point slippage.
These re ‡ect the lower commissions typically paid on larger lot sizes, and some market impact on the larger trades. We …nd that none of the position or transaction costs assumptions has a qualitative impact on our pro…t estimates.
We examine pro…ts for all trades for the four months in found in other studies of retail investors or daytraders. This is why we feel comfortable regarding these semi-professional and professional traders as experts.
We can directly address the e¤ects of trading on pro…ts with our imputed transaction data base. We regress the pro…ts of each trader under assumption A on the number of trades they make during the month. We …nd a strong positive incremental pro…t of $152:66 per trade in the pooled sample. In the month of June-July 2003, with a smaller number of surviving traders as the bear market ends, each trade earns an incremental pro…t of $245:67. These experts are not losing from trading too much. They are "Activetraders" for a good reason; trading makes them money.
Our traders make money trading both long and short. When we break apart pro…ts short versus long, we …nd that 74:7% of pro…ts are made trading long and 25:3% short. Trades are equally likely to be pro…table long versus short, 53:97% long compared to 56:07% short. The marginal pro…t per trade is substantially higher on the short side than the long, $210:84 per trade short versus $110:87 long in the pooled sample. Short traders are also more skillful overall. Over the four years, 51:55%
of traders who never short are pro…table under assumption A, compared with 62:21% for traders who trade both short and long.
For the remainder of this section, we will utilize pro…t assumptions A.
E¤ect of holding period on pro…ts
To calculate the disposition e¤ect, we calculate the length of the round-trip holding period for winners and losers in the entire chat room's portfolio. We only used the round-trip trades where we have entry and exit time stamps.
We …nd that our traders realize their losses quickly and hold their winners longer. The average holding period for losing trades was 47:87 minutes. Winners were held on average 25% longer or 60:23 minutes. Shefrin and Statman (1985) pointed out that professional traders employ precommitment mechanisms, such as stop losses and target percentage, to control their resistance to realizing losses. Our survey data and trade postings from Activetrader corroborate the use of these techniques. Dhar and Zhu (2002) found that wealthier and well-educated traders could mitigate the disposition e¤ect. Our skilled traders actually reverse it.
Adjusted returns
We measure excess returns as daily portfolio returns R p;t less the risk free rate, R f : We also adjust the returns for the three Fama and French (1993) factors and a factor for momentum. The …rst factor is the value weighted return on all NYSE, Nasdaq, and AMEX stocks less the risk free rate. This is the standard CAPM factor. The second factor SMB adjusts for market capitalization. It places 1/3 weights on the di¤erence between three small portfolios and three big portfolios consisting of value, neutral and growth stocks. The third factor HML adjusts for value versus growth. It is the average di¤erence of two value and two growth portfolios.
The data for the …rst three factors are from the daily return series on Ken French's website 6 .
We constructed the fourth factor using the methodology in Carhart (1997) and Barber, Odean and Zhu (2003) . It consists of a portfolio of stocks with the highest and lowest 30% of returns in the preceding trading month. The momentum factor is the daily return di¤erence between an equal weighted portfolio of the high and low return stocks.
[INSERT Table 9 Here]
These four factors explain a good deal of the excess return of the chat room traders in Table   9 . Are surviving traders likely to be successful in the next trading period? Let j;T denote trading pro…ts for trader j in the current trading month. Then regress current month pro…ts on the pro…ts from last year, j;T = a 0 + a 1 j;T 1:
The results for this regression for T = 2001; 2002 and 2003, are in Table 10 .
[INSERT Table 10 Here]
The a 1 is signi…cantly positive in two of three years, and in the pooled regression. We next see if experience contributes to pro…ts. Let A j;T be the number of years that the trader has posted trades into Activetrader including the current year. We estimate the model
Estimation results are in Table 10 . We …nd a weak but positive relationship between pro…ts and experience. b 1 is positive in 2001, 2002, 2003 An alternative measure of experience is stock speci…c. Perhaps traders bene…t from trading a particular stock more frequently. If there is stock speci…c knowledge, we should …nd that more trades should raise the pro…tability of the trader j;T =n j;T . We measure trade concentration as we did previously using the Her…ndahl index, j;T =n j;T = c 0 + c 1 H j;T :
Results for this regression for pro…table traders who make at least three trades 7 during the month are in Table 10 . This last …nding provides a fresh perspective on the familiarity bias literature. Traders appear to develop expertise trading speci…c stocks that enhances their pro…tability.
Conclusion
Our group of skilled traders has ignored many of the lessons from their …nance classes. They have incredibly high turnover; they focus on the same stocks regardless of market conditions. They make no attempt to diversify. In spite of all these errors, nearly 55% earn pro…ts after transactions costs. Trading earns them money, and not surprisingly, they trade often.
They are more sophisticated than simple momentum investors. The momentum factor accounts for little of their daily returns. Together with the other Fama-French factors, we estimate a statistically signi…cant of 0:41% per day. Further evidence of their skill can be seen in their ability to earn pro…ts both long and short.
Their knowledge also appears to grow and adapt to market conditions. Traders realize losses quickly and hold their winners 25% longer. Traders maintain 38% of their pro…ts from one-year to the next. Each year of experience adds to their pro…ts. Concentrating on a small group of stocks enhances their pro…tability.
Market surveys indicate the in ‡uence of these professional traders. 25% of daily volume on the NYSE and Nasdaq comes from semi-professional traders 8 . We hope that this paper has helped to shed some light on this small but important group. 
